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In 2005, India amended its Patent Law to bring the country into compliance with the WTO TRIPS Agreement. Criticisms 
have arisen over a flexibility in the law, Section 3(d), which attempts to reduce evergreening by granting patents to only 
those inventions that enhance the drug’s known efficacy. The lack of a clear definition in the law has raised worldwide 
concerns over its misuse which was exacerbated by the 2013 Supreme Court denial of Novartis’s Appeal of Section 3(d)-
based patent rejection for the cancer treatment drug, Glivec. To analyze the importance of Section 3(d) and this ruling on 
patent decisions in India, a database of 500 pharmaceutical patent cases between 2005 and 2016 was created. The 
determinants of patent decisions were estimated using a binomial logit regression and conducted a statistical analysis to 
identify their confounding factors. The results show that if a patent application has Section 3(d) objection, the odds of the 
case being rejected and/or abandoned more than double. Also, although the odds of patent rejections have fallen since the 
2013 Supreme Court ruling, this result is driven by non-Section 3(d) cases. Thus, it was concluded that Section 3(d) will 
play an increasingly important role in patent rejections.  
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This paper examines pharmaceutical patent approvals 
in India since 2005. In 1995, the WTO TRIPS (Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) 
Agreement went into effect, aimed at harmonizing 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) across the globe. 
Developing countries such as India had ten years 
(until 2005) to become compliant with the TRIPS 
Agreement. Given India’s status as a leading generic 
drug manufacturer, changes to India’s patent system, 
which greatly affected the pharmaceutical sector, had 
global implications.  
India’s patent law, The Patents Act, 1970 was 
amended to become compliant with the TRIPS 
Agreement. Amendments passed in 1999, 2002, and 
2005 (all effective from 1 January 2005) were 
expected to provide stricter protections for intellectual 
property, and thus, promote innovation. However, 
some portions of the amendments that provided 
flexibility (allowed under TRIPS) have been 
considered a hindrance to protecting intellectual 
property rights (IPRs). Specifically, the 2005 
amendment that revised Section 3(d) has been 
controversial. Section 3(d) prohibits the granting of 
patents for those inventions that do not enhance the 
drug’s known efficacy. The goal was to deter 
evergreening (extending the life of a patent through 
slight modifications) which poses an even greater 
burden to health care access (compared to the original 
patent). Critics argue that Section 3(d) has been 
misused. This paper examines the importance of 
Section 3(d) in pharmaceutical patent decisions in 
India.  
Restrictions related to evergreening are not unique 
to India. Mexico and Japan have similar clauses and 
Philippines, Brazil, and Argentina are working toward 
them.1 However, the focus on India is important for 
two reasons. First, changes to India’s patent regime 
could have global repercussions to health access as 
the country is a significant producer and exporter of 
pharmaceuticals.1,2 Second, the flexibilities in the new 
stricter regime aimed at balancing health access and 
innovation make India an important case study in the 
IPRs debate. This is especially significant in the case 
of Section 3(d) in India’s patent law, which is 
considered controversial because of its lack of clarity 
and in turn, has raised concerns of its misuse. This has 
been further exacerbated with the 2013 Supreme 
Court ruling on the Novartis v Union of India case, 
which denied the company’s appeal of a patent 
rejection based on Section 3(d).  
The paper seeks to answer three questions:  
Is Section 3(d) a significant determinant of patent 
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rejections? Has the Novartis case had an impact on 
patent decisions? What factors shed light on cases 
with Section 3(d) objections? To address these 
questions, we built a database of 500 pharmaceutical 
patent cases between 2005 and 2016 and examined 
various characteristics of these rulings. Using our 
database a binomial logit regression on the factors 
[including Section 3(d)] that affect patent decisions, 
as well as conduct a comparative analysis of cases 
with and without Section 3(d) objections were 
estimated. It was found that Section 3(d) is a 
statistically significant determinant of patent cases 
being rejected and/or abandoned. This relationship is 
complicated by the location at which the application 
is filed and the timing of the decision (pre- or post- 
the Supreme Court ruling on the Novartis case).  
Protection of IPRs is defended on grounds of 
promoting innovation, however that is heavily 
debated.3 However, stricter IPRs can lead to a loss of 
social welfare in developing countries.4 This is an 
even greater concern when the focus is health-related, 
and played a significant role in the 1995 WTO TRIPS 
Agreement, which ultimately led to the inclusion of 
flexibilities.  
The Indian Patents Act was amended in 1999, 
2002, and 2005 to bring the country into compliance 
with TRIPS. However, even before the amendments 
came into effect in 2005, India’s protection of IPRs 
had been strengthening. The value assigned to India 
for the index of patent rights rose from 1.23 (out of 5) 
in 1995 to 3.76 in 2005.5,6 Stricter laws on IPRs can 
increase foreign investment and innovation.7,8 
However, this relationship is affected by a country’s 
level of economic development.9 
Increased levels of economic growth in India in the 
1990s, combined with a stricter patent law, was thus 
expected to have a positive impact on innovation. In 
fact, the number of patent applications in India 
increased dramatically from 4,824 in 1999-2000 to 
34,287 in 2009-2010.10 There was a significant 
number of patent applications originating from 
domestic firms in India.11Also important, was the 
increase in patent filings from small firms.12 Some 
have argued that the shift from process to product 
patents has hurt domestic innovation in India.8 There 
is also evidence of little to no effect on India’s 
pharmaceutical sector since the shift in patent laws.2 
Results from probit and logit estimation show that 
TRIPS compliance is necessary for innovation but not 
a sufficient condition for improving export 
performance.13 The effect of India’s “calibrated 
approach” (incremental protections) is unclear.14 In 
fact, the ultimate impact may be linked to how the law 
is administered.15 This is related to the flexibilities in 
India’s patent laws that weaken IPRs protection. The 
focus is on one such flexibility, Section 3(d), which is 
designed to deter evergreening (making slight 
modifications to drugs to extend patent rights).  
Proponents support evergreening to promote 
investment, research, and innovation while critics 
argue that it denies access to life saving drugs. 
Through Section 3(d), India “has taken the first step 
in introducing legislative measures to check the 
practice of evergreening” and thus makes analyzing 
this component of the law important.15 What makes it 
even more important is that India’s law is becoming a 
model for developing countries even while it is under 
attack from developed countries.16 The US-India 
Business Council has called for the elimination of 
Section 3(d) and Trans-Pacific Partnership 
negotiations have sought to curb the spread of 
similarly focused legislation.1,16 
The problem is the ambiguity of language in 
Section 3(d).17 Specifically, the phrase enhanced 
known efficacy gives the decision-maker a lot of 
latitude in interpreting the law and can thus be 
misused. That the language is ambiguous is not in 
question. Whether this ambiguity has been overused 
needs further exploration. This paper sheds light on 
the importance of Section 3(d) in patent  
decision-making in India.  
 
India’s Patent Laws and Pharmaceutical Sector  
The Designs and Patents Act of 1911 protected 
IPRs in India pre-independence and until 1970 when 
it was replaced by The Patents Act, 1970 (referred 
hereafter as Patents Act). This law shifted patents 
from products to processes and reduced patent rights 
from 16 years to 7 years. Through reverse 
engineering, (which involves breaking down or taking 
apart a known compound or substance to discover its 
composition and lead to alternative and cheaper ways 
to produce them), the Patents Act led to a dramatic 
growth in India’s pharmaceutical sector and 
empowered the country to become a leader in generic 
drug production. Between 1970 and 2000, the number 
of pharmaceutical companies in India increased from 
2,000 to 20,000 and by 2006, Indian pharmaceutical 
companies supplied 95% of the total domestic market 
compared to 20% in 1970.8 The country also became 
a significant supplier of pharmaceuticals to the 
developing world.1,2 Exports have exceeded imports in 




the pharmaceutical sector since 1987; in the 2000s the 
industry grew at an annual rate of 10% and exports of 
pharmaceuticals grew at 20%.18 In 2005, India had the 
third largest active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) 
market in the world, valued at $ 2 billion.19 
In 1994, India signed the TRIPS (1995) Agreement 
with changes to be enacted within ten years.20 The 
amendments (1999, 2002, and 2005) that brought the 
Patents Act into compliance with TRIPS included a 
mailbox system (allowing companies to file for 
patents before the 2005 law was enacted), increased 
the term of patents from 7 to 20 years, and added 
definitions for inventions.1 Global generic 
pharmaceutical corporations invested heavily in 
research facilities in India, making India “the single 
largest (generic) pharma player in the world, post-
TRIPS.”21 
The Office of the Controller of Patents, Designs & 
Trade Marks examines and adjudicates on patent 
cases. Applications for patents must be sent to the 
appropriate jurisdictional branch under the Office of 
Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade 
Marks. There are four patent office branches located 
in Chennai, Kolkata, Mumbai, and New Delhi and 
each has jurisdiction over neighboring states. 
Applicants must file at the appropriate office based on 
their place of residence, business, or service.22 
Fig. 1 shows the patent process. After an application 
is made and published, it is examined by the controller 
who prepares a first examination report (FER). 
Typically, the FER raises objections which the applicant 
has one year to address and is considered abandoned 
after that time. Prior to a decision on the patent, there is a 
possibility of a pre-grant opposition (criteria listed in 
Section 25(1) of the Patents Act). A patent is rejected if 
the controller sides with the pre-grant opposition or if 
the objections raised in the FER are not satisfactorily 
addressed; otherwise the patent is granted for a period of 
20 years from the date of application. It is referred as 
round 1. Most cases end here. 
However, it is possible that the decision is 
challenged. A patent grant can be challenged by a 
post-grant opposition and a patent rejection can be 
challenged by the applicant. If there is a post-grant 
 
 
Fig.1 — The process of obtaining a patent 




opposition (based on criteria similar to the pre-grant 
opposition), the Opposition Board hears the post-grant 
opposition case and the Controller makes the final 
decision (to keep or revoke the patent). This is round 
2A. If a patent is rejected, the applicant has a right to 
appeal. The case may be submitted to the Intellectual 
Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and their decision 
signals completion of round 2B. Challenges to the law 
may be filed with the High Court, and if necessary, 
the Supreme Court.23 
Patent decisions have been affected by the 
amendments to the law, which have included flexibilities 
allowed in the TRIPS Agreement. One such flexibility is 
related to deterring evergreening (extension of patent 
rights). In order to restrict evergreening, the law has to 
define what is and is not considered an invention. The 
former is addressed in Section 2(1) (j) of The Patents 
Act while the limits to inventions are embodied in 
Section 3(d) of The Patents Act and Patents 
(Amendments) Act, 2005. Also important are Section 
3(e) that narrows the definition of inventions and 
Section 10(4) which lists the necessary requirements for 
a complete specification.  
According to Section 3(d): “the mere discovery of 
a new form of a known substance which does not 
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of 
that substance or the mere discovery of any new 
property or new use for a known substance or the 
mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus 
unless such known process results in a new product or 
employs at least a new reactant” [the 2005 
modification of Section 3(d)]. 
Section 3(d) is designed to restrict extension of 
monopoly rights for minor or inconsequential changes 
and is under constant attack by pharmaceutical 
companies who are suspicious that it is a loophole to 
circumvent patent rights.  
“The “other derivatives of known 
substances” clause of Section 3(d) of the Indian 
patent law is nebulous and arbitrary. It could be 
interpreted to deny nearly any new patent claim 
since so many drugs are derived, at least in part, 
from previously known substances. And even if a 
patent was granted, it could be easily challenged 
by some party that currently copies it (or would 
want to). Section 3(d) is so arbitrary that it 
encourages litigation and undermines incentives 
for innovation.”24 
The controversy surrounding Section 3(d) escalated 
with the landmark case, Novartis v The Union of 
India & Others, which resulted in patent rejection for 
Glivec, under violation of Section 3(d). Glivec, 
Novartis’s cancer drug, which treats Chronic Myeloid 
Leukemia, brought in $ 4.71 billion in global sales in 
2012 with an annual cost per-patient ranging from $ 
25,000 to $50,000, as opposed to a generic version of 
$2,100.25 Novartis applied for a patent in India on a 
chemical compound for Glivec but was denied the 
patent because the Assistant Controller of Patents 
agreed with the pre-grant opposition (filed by Cancer 
Patients Aid Association, other non-profit 
organizations, and some drug companies) that “the 
new version of Glivec was not sufficiently different 
from the old unprotected version to warrant a 
patent.”15 Novartis sued to change the patent ruling 
(with the IPAB) and to challenge Section 3(d) which 
they argued was in violation of TRIPS (with the 
Madras High Court), but lost both cases.15 Novartis 
appealed and the Supreme Court of India ruled that 
the chemical compound, imatinib mesylate, was not 
an invention as described by 2(1)(j)/(ja) because  
it was known from the Zimmermann patent and also 
violated Section 3(d) because it did not enhance 
therapeutic efficacy.15 
Supporters of India’s ruling on this case argue that 
Novartis was extending monopoly rights through 
evergreening and the ruling was a victory for public 
health access. However, critics are concerned that 
weak protections hurt innovation and thus, health 
access.25 Also having flexibilities by itself does not 
increase affordable generic drug production; 
appropriate economic and political conditions are 
necessary as well.26 We do not wade through the 
debate about patent regimes and health access. Rather, 
the paper focuses on whether the Novartis decision is 
representative of future rulings, specifically, to 
explore if Section 3(d) plays a significant role in 
patent rulings.  
The importance of Section 3(d) in patent rulings 
since 2005 using patent cases from both domestic and 
foreign pharmaceutical companies were estimated.  
A database was prepared to include decisions (patents 
granted, rejected, or abandoned cases), the often-
raised objections in the FER (Sections 2(1)(j)/(ja), 
3(d), 3(e), 10(4) on the patent law), jurisdiction of the 
Office where the patent was filed (Chennai, Kolkata, 
Mumbai, New Delhi), whether the applicant company 
was domestic or foreign, and whether the decision 
was pre- or post- the 2013 Supreme Court ruling on 
the Novartis case (which upheld the High Court ruling 




of denying Novartis’s appeal of the rejection of the 
patent for Glivec based on Section 3(d)). The 
binominal logit regression was estimated to examine 
the impact of Section 3(d) (and other factors) on 
patent decisions. Two dependent variables were used, 
one with focus on rejected cases (versus granted 
cases), and the other to combine rejected and 
abandoned cases (versus granted cases). While a 
rejected case is different from an abandoned case, it is 
possible that various factors that could lead to a 
rejection may also cause the company to abandon the 
case. The equation to be estimated is given as: 
 
= + + + +
+ + 3( ) +  …(1) 
 
where  is dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
patent case is rejected or rejected +abandoned and 0 if 
granted. All of the independent variables are also 
dummy variables that equal 1 if the condition is met 
and 0 otherwise.  refers to the applicant being a 
domestic firm, which we hypothesize may lead to 
greater patent grants since domestic firms may benefit 
from having more knowledge of a country’s 
conventions and patent and legal system. The 
variables , , and  refer to three of the 
four jurisdictional offices where patent applications 
are submitted, Kolkata, Mumbai, and New Delhi 
respectively. The omitted jurisdiction office captured 
in the constant is Chennai. These variables are 
included to test if jurisdiction of the patent office 
matters. 	represents the period after the Supreme 
Court delivered its ruling on the Novartis case. This 
variable is included to test the concern that this 
landmark case will influence future patent rulings, 
specifically increase patent rejections (or cases being 
abandoned). The last independent variable captures 
the impact of a Section 3(d) objection. The 
expectation is that this will increase the odds of a case 
being rejected and/or abandoned.  
To gain a better understanding of the factors that 
affect a Section 3(d) case, we organize the cases as 
shown in Fig. 2. 
The cases with and without a Section 3(d) 
objections (* and + respectively) were separated and 
categorized in granted, rejected, or abandoned cases. 
The differences in patent rulings for Section 3(d) and 
non-Section 3(d) cases for various scenarios such as, 
jurisdiction of patent office, ownership of company, 
other objections, and pre- or post- Novartis ruling 
were analyzed. By comparing granted / rejected / 
abandoned cases with and without Section 3(d) 
objections (G*/ R*/ A* and G+/ R+/ A,+ respectively) in 
these categories the following questions were 
addressed: Are Section 3(d) cases more or less likely 
to be granted/ rejected/ abandoned compared to cases 
without a Section 3(d) objection? How do other 
objections impact these decisions? Does jurisdiction 
matter for Section 3(d) and non-Section 3(d) rulings? 
Is ownership of the company a differentiator?  
Did the Supreme Court ruling on Novartis have a 
different impact on Section 3(d) and non-Section 3(d) 
cases?  
 
Section 3(d) and Patent Rulings  
A database of pharmaceutical patent case rulings in 
India since 2005 was prepared.27 These include 500 




Fig. 2 — Examination of Section 3(d) cases 
Notes: * indicates there was a Section 3(d) objection and + if there is any objection other than Section 3(d) including but not limited to 
Sections 2(1)(j)/(ja), 3(e) and 10(4). 




Table 2 shows out of 500 cases, approximately 
equal amount of cases were granted (207 or 41.40%) 
as were abandoned (221 or 44.20%). At 72, only 
14.40% of all cases were rejected. A majority of all 
applications were made in New Delhi followed 
closely by Mumbai (166 and 157 respectively). Over 
71% of total applications (357) were filed by foreign 
firms. This is likely related to the expertise and 
financial advantage of large global firms such as 
Merck (63), Roche (52), and Novartis (49) (Table 1). 
Importantly, the largest number of applications (65) 
are from a domestic firm, Cadila (Table 1).  
Cases with patents granted or rejected, or which 
were abandoned are reported for various objections, 
jurisdiction of patent office, and ownership of the 
company. Table 2 also shows the breakdown of 
Section 3(d) objections raised in these cases.  
A significant amount of cases include multiple 
objections, so we present information of cases with 
only a Section 3(d) objection (43 or 8%) and those 
with multiple objections including Section 3(d)  
(223 or 45%). Finally, only 15% of all cases were 
decided prior to the 2013 Supreme Court ruling on the 
Novartis case.  
To examine the importance of Section 3(d) in 
patent rulings the regression results presented in  
Table 3 were analyzed. This regression estimates the 
impact of various factors, including Section 3(d) in 
Table 1 — Pharmaceutical companies in sample (Total = 500) 
Company No. of 
cases 
AbbVie (AbbVie Biotherapeutics Inc., AbbVie 
Biotechnology Ltd., AbbVie Inc.) 
13 
Amgen (Amgen Inc., Amgen Research (Munich) GMBH) 8 
AstraZeneca (AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 
AstraZeneca Pharma India Ltd.) 
40 
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. 13 
Bristol Myers Squibb Company 23 
Cadila (Cadila Healthcare Ltd., Cadila Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd.) 
65 
Cipla Ltd. 26 
Eli Lilly and Company 4 
Gilead (Gilead Sciences Inc., Gilead Pharmasset LLC) 5 
Glaxo Smith Kline LLC 1 
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals (Glenmark Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd., Glenmark Pharmaceuticals S.A.) 
10 
Johnson & Johnson (J&J Research PTY Limited, J&J 
Vision Care, Inc., J&J Consumer Companies, Inc.) 
22 
Lupin Ltd. 10 
Merck (Merck Serono S.A., Merck Sharp & Dohme 
Corp, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp UK, Merck & Co Inc 
USA, Merck & Co Inc., Merck Patent GMBH,  
Merck Frosst Canada Ltd.) 
63 
Novartis (Novartis AG, Novartis Vaccines and 
Diagnostics SRL, Novartis AG of Switzerland) 
49 
Pfizer (Pfizer Inc., Pfizer Products Inc., Pfizer Limited) 29 
Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (acquired by Sun 
Pharmaceuticals) 
8 
Roche (F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG) 52 
Sanofi (Sanofi Aventis, Sanofi Aventis U.S LLC,  
Sanofi Aventis Deutschland GMBH, Sanofi Synthelabo, 
France, Sanofi Pasteur, Sanofi Pasteur Ltd.) 
34 
Sun Pharmaceuticals (Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., 
Sun Pharmaceutical Advanced Research Company Ltd.) 
6 
Teva (Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Teva 
Pharmaceuticals International GMBH) 
14 
Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 5 
Source: Intellectual Property India, http://ipindiaservices.gov.in/ 
publicsearch 
Table 2 — Summary statistics 
Cases Granted Rejected Abandoned 
All cases: 500 207 72 221 
Jurisdiction of Patent Office 
Chennai: 94 (18.80%) 27 27 40 
Kolkata: 83 (16.60%) 40 9 34 
Mumbai: 157 (31.40%) 69 16 72 
New Delhi: 166 (33.20%) 71 20 75 
Ownership of company 
Domestic: 143 (28.60%) 59 16 68 
Foreign: 357 (71.40%) 148 56 153 
Objections 
Section 3(d) objections: 223 (44.60%) 76 34 113 
Only Section 3(d) objections:  
43 (8.60%) 
18 6 19 
Novartis ruling 
Pre-Novartis ruling: 71 (14.20%) 23 25 23
Post-Novartis ruling: 429 (85.80%) 184 47 198
Source: Data from Intellectual Property India, 
http://ipindiaservices.gov.in/publicsearch; authors’ computations  
 
 
Table 3 — Regression results for reject and/ or abandoned cases 
 Regression 1  
DV = Rejected 
cases (279) 
Regression 2  
DV = Rejected and/ or 
abandoned cases (500) 
Variables Coeff. [p-value] Coeff. [p-value] 
Constant 2.104 [0.028] 3.032 [0.001] 
S3(d) 2.192* [0.007] 2.048* [0.000] 
Dom 1.240 [0.320] 1.236 [0.277] 
Kol 0.261* [0.001] 0.398* [0.014] 
Mum 0.229* [0.001] 0.441* [0.014] 
ND 0.238* [0.001] 0.441* [0.014] 
Rul 0.248* [0.000] 0.599* [0.037] 
Chi-square p-value [0.000]* [0.000]* 
Source: Data from Intellectual Property India; authors’ 
estimations using Stata 12. *Represents statistical significance at 
the 5% level of significance.  




patent rulings (either for rejections or for a 
combination of rejections and abandoned cases). The 
odds ratios are reported. Results show that for both 
dependent variables, the model is a good fit (based on 
the Chi-Squire test), meaning that the variables are 
jointly statistically significant.  
The regression estimates the factors that affect 
cases that are rejected (Regression 1) or rejected and 
abandoned (Regression 2). For the three Patent Office 
variables a Wald test for joint statistical significance 
was conducted and reported (in italics) instead of 
individual p-values. To test for the fit of the model the 
chi-square p-value was reported. If the p-value is less 
than the significance level, it can be concluded that 
the model without the predictors is a poor fit and thus 
the variables are jointly statistically significant.  
A domestic firm may see fewer rejected or 
abandoned cases because of their familiarity of 
conventions and systems. The odds of a rejection and/ 
or a case being abandoned are higher if the application 
is made by a domestic firm. This is because the 
expected home court advantage of domestic firms is 
reversed by the larger resources (financial and legal) 
available to foreign firms. Also, some foreign firms 
(Novartis, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, among others) 
have established the presence in India, and thus would 
not be at a disadvantage compared with domestic firms. 
This variable is not statistically significant which may 
be related to the sure magnitude of foreign patent 
applications (357 or 71%).  
Based on the Wald test, jurisdiction of the patent 
office matters. The odds for a rejected and/ or 
abandoned case are highest for Chennai (the omitted 
condition) and lowest for Mumbai, although the 
difference is very small for Kolkata, Mumbai, and 
New Delhi. This indicates that Chennai is the strictest 
of the four patent offices. Chennai receives about the 
same number of applications as Kolkata but far fewer 
than New Delhi or Mumbai (Table 2).  
The Novartis case may have led to greater 
rejections (or abandoned cases) because the Supreme 
Court upheld the earlier decisions of a patent rejection 
based on Section 3(d). The results however, show 
lower odds for rejection for cases decided after the 
2013 Supreme Court ruling on Novartis. Specifically, 
the odds of a patent being rejected fall by 75% after 
this decision. Thus, rather than being precedent-
setting in increasing patent rejections, the Novartis 
ruling has had a reverse impact. Perhaps the global 
controversy has led to greater scrutiny of patent 
decisions making examiners more cautious. One 
caveat is that the regression results are for all patent 
cases, not just those based on Section 3(d) objections. 
Therefore, it is possible that the ruling may still hurt 
Section 3(d)-based patent applications even though 
overall patent applications are more likely to be 
granted after this landmark ruling.  
As noted earlier, approximately half of the cases in 
the sample had a Section 3(d) objection (Table 2). 
The regression results in Table 3 show that this clause 
is a statistically significant determinant of rejection 
and/ or abandoned cases. As expected this objection 
increases the chances of a case being rejected and/ or 
abandoned. At a value of approximately 2, the odds of 
a patent case being rejected and/ or abandoned double 
when there is a Section 3(d) objection. This clearly 
highlights the importance of this clause and the 
difficulty of overcoming this objection.  
One reason for this difficulty is the phrase 
“therapeutic efficacy” which as noted earlier is 
ambiguous and too restrictive.28 Thus, it is important 
to identify the factors that are associated with a 
Section 3(d) objection and rulings. Table 4 compares 
patent decisions of cases with and without Section 
3(d) objections. Granted v rejected cases (denoted as 
GR), and granted v rejected or abandoned cases 
(denoted as GRA) are analyzed in Table 4.  
The patent grant, reject, or abandoned cases are 
separated based on Section 3(d) or non- Section 3(d) 
objections. The number of cases granted, rejected, and 
abandoned for each category as well as granted cases 
as a percentage of granted and rejected cases (G/ GR) 
and granted cases as a percentage of granted, rejected, 
and abandoned cases (G/ GRA) are reported. A 
greater portion of non-Section 3(d) cases are granted. 
There are 76 granted cases with Section 3(d) 
objections which make up 69% of GR cases and 34% 
of GRA cases. For non-Section 3(d) cases, these 
numbers are 131 granted cases which are 78% and 
47% for GR and GRA cases, respectively.  
Chennai has the lowest percentage of granted cases 
for both Section 3(d) and non-Section (d) cases. For 
Section 3(d) cases, 50% of Chennai’s GR cases and 
25% of Chennai’s GRA are granted compared with 
68%-75% of GR cases and 35%-36% of GRA cases 
for the other jurisdiction offices. For non-Section 3(d) 
cases, granted cases in Chennai are 50% of GR cases 
and 30% of GRA cases. These numbers range from 
84%-93% of GR cases and 48%-63% of GRA cases 
for other jurisdiction offices. This supports the 




regression result that Chennai is a more difficult 
jurisdiction for patent applications in general, but also 
shows that the unusually high odds of rejection in 
Chennai are associated with non-Section 3(d) cases.  
Domestic firms have greater percentages of granted 
cases. However, whether a case has a Section 3(d) 
objection or not, does not lead to significant differences 
in the share of granted cases for domestic compared to 
foreign firms. Thus, ownership does not appear to be a 
differentiator in rulings on Section 3(d) cases.  
Focusing only on G/ GR, Section 3(d) cases which 
also have Section 2(1)(j)/(ja) objections have a lower 
percentage of granted compared with Sections 3(e) 
and 10(4). The percentages are 63%, 74%, and 83% 
respectively. The pattern is similar but the differences 
are not that stark when compared with granted cases 
as a share of all cases (GRA). Those percentages are 
28%, 38%, and 29% respectively. Non-Section 3(d) 
cases have a lower share of granted cases for those 
with Section 10(4) objections (63% for GR cases and 
30% for GRA cases). The difference between Section 
10(4) and Sections 2(1)(j)/(ja) and 3(e) are minor 
when considering GR cases (64% and 68% for 
Sections (1)(j)/(ja) and 3(e), respectively) and are 
bigger for GRA cases, 38% and 44% respectively. 
Overall, a clear story does not emerge about the 
importance of these other objections as a 
distinguishing feature of Section 3(d) cases.  
The difference between the percentages of non-
Section 3(d) cases granted pre- and post- the Novartis 
ruling is significant. Before the Supreme Court 
delivered its final decision, 41% of GR cases and 27% 
of GRA cases were granted as opposed to 86% and 
52% of GR and GRA cases after the ruling. When 
consider Section 3(d) cases, a greater percentage of 
GR cases are granted after the Novartis ruling (70%) 
compared with prior to it (63%). This difference is not 
as significant as what we see for non-Section 3(d) 
cases noted earlier. Also, the trend is reversed when 
we consider GRA cases. This suggests that our 
regression results of lower odds for rejected and/ or 
abandoned cases after the Novartis ruling were driven 
by non-Section 3(d) cases. Thus, while our evidence 
should alleviate the fears of those who believed that 
the Novartis ruling would reduce patent grants, it does 
not eliminate the concerns related to Section 3(d) use.  
 
Conclusion  
Critics of Section 3(d) have argued that this piece 
of the law is misused. Approximately, 45% of the 
cases in the sample have 3(d) objections which 
support concerns that this piece of the law may be 
heavily used. Also, Section 3(d) objection is a 
statistically significant determinant of patent 
decisions. The odds of a case being rejected and/ 
abandoned double if there is a Section 3(d) objection. 
By itself, this would not indicate misuse of Section 
3(d). Two other conclusions from our regression 
results and case analysis are noteworthy. First is the 
Supreme Court ruling on the Novartis case, which 
Table 4 — Patent decisions for Section 3(d) and non-Section 3(d) cases 
 Section 3(d) objections cases (223) No Section 3(d) objections cases (277) 
Category G*/ R / A* G / (GR)* G*/ (GRA)* G+/ R+/ A+ G+/ (GR)+ G+/ (GRA)+ 
 76/ 34/ 113 69% 34% 131/ 38/ 108 78% 47% 
Jurisdiction of Patent Office 
Chennai (28, 66) 7/ 7/ 14 50% 25% 20/ 20/ 26 50% 30% 
Kolkata (43, 40) 15/ 7/ 21 68% 35% 25/ 2/ 13 93% 63% 
Mumbai (50, 107) 18 / 6/ 26 75% 36% 51/ 10/ 46 84% 48% 
New Delhi (102, 64) 36/ 14/ 52 72% 35% 35/ 6/ 23 85% 55% 
Ownership of company 
Domestic (51, 92) 17/ 6/ 28 74% 33% 42/ 10/ 40 81% 46% 
Foreign (172, 185) 59/ 28/ 85 68% 34% 89/ 28/ 68 76% 48% 
Objections 
Section 2(1)(j)/(ja) (149, 116) 42/ 25/ 82 63% 28% 44/ 25/ 47 64% 38% 
Section 3(e) (74, 34) 29/ 10/ 35 74% 39% 15/ 7/ 12 68% 44% 
Section 10(4) (34, 33) 10/ 12/ 22 83% 29% 10/ 6/ 17 63% 30% 
Novartis Ruling 
Pre- (23, 48) 10/ 6/ 7 63% 43% 13/ 19/ 16 41% 27% 
Post-(200, 229) 66/ 28/ 106 70% 33% 118/ 19/ 92 86% 52% 
Source: Data from Intellectual Property India; authors’ computations. 




was based on a Section 3(d) objection. Surprisingly, 
the odds of a rejection after this ruling dropped 
drastically. This may be because examiners are more 
cautious given the increased scrutiny caused by the 
controversial case. This may allay the fears of misuse 
of Section 3(d). However, we find that this decline in 
rejections is related to non-Section 3(d) cases. 
Another conclusion relates to jurisdictional 
differences in patent decisions. The applications to 
Chennai Office have the highest odds for cases being 
rejected and/ or abandoned. The Patent Office denied 
Novartis the patent based on Section 3(d). Thus, it 
may be reasonable to conclude that fewer Section 3(d) 
cases are granted in Chennai compared to other 
offices. However, that is true for non-Section 3(d) 
cases as well. Moreover, the differential between 
Chennai and the other offices (Kolkata, Mumbai, and 
New Delhi) is much greater for non-Section 3(d) 
cases. This leads us to conclude that while Chennai is 
a stricter jurisdiction, it is not because of Section 3(d).  
Section 3(d), and similar versions of it in patent 
laws in other countries, was designed to restrict the 
extension of monopoly rights for slight modifications. 
The findings show that the odds of patents being 
rejected and/ or abandoned increase due to Section 
3(d). Supporters of this may thus look at the statistics 
and argue that this clause is working as it should. 
Critics of this clause may fear the high and increasing 
reliance on Section 3(d).  
Results highlight the complexity of drawing 
conclusions since there are contradictory influences of 
factors that affect Section 3(d) objections and rulings. 
However, critics of Section 3(d) are correct to be 
wary. With more Section 3(d) objections, not only 
will the odds of a patent being rejected or a case being 
abandoned increase, but the impact of other factors 
will become less important. Thus, the influence of 
Section 3(d) on patent decisions will continue to rise. 
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